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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF AMERICANS 
ABROAD: RE-EXAMINING THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT’S WARRANT CLAUSE AND THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE EXCEPTION FIVE 
YEARS AFTER UNITED STATES V. BIN LADEN  
COREY M. THEN 
The proposition is, of course, not that the Constitution ‘does not 
apply’ overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution 
which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign 
place. 
—Justice John Harlan1 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States intelligence community subjects certain 
American citizens living abroad to secret wiretaps of their phones and 
physical searches of their homes, without obtaining a judicial warrant. 
Take for instance a Texan, living with his wife and young children in 
Kenya, whose every telephone conversation was monitored for a year 
and whose home was entered while he was away in order to 
confiscate his property. Should Americans care that their government 
might so intrude on their privacy without a warrant? Should those 
sentiments change when the Texan is an al-Qaeda operative who 
participated in the terrorist attacks on United States Embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania, and who was later convicted of conspiracy to 
commit murder and destroy U.S. property? 
Certainly, Americans should be concerned about their 
government’s surveillance powers, especially during a war on terror 
that differs from any other conflict in our nation’s history. Yet since a 
federal district judge decided five years ago in United States v. Bin 
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 1. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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Laden2 that a judicial warrant is not required to search Americans 
abroad when the information sought is primarily for foreign 
intelligence rather than criminal investigative purposes,3 the judiciary 
has been silent on this point. Because the constitutionality of these 
warrantless searches is by no means settled, the recent five-year 
anniversary of Bin Laden makes this a fitting time to re-examine the 
judicial approach to searches of Americans living abroad during the 
war on terror and to determine whether a different standard is 
needed. 
This Note argues that warrants to conduct electronic surveillance 
and physical searches of Americans abroad are neither 
constitutionally required nor an effective safeguard of liberty. 
Whereas the majority of the scant commentary on Bin Laden has 
criticized it for asserting a foreign intelligence exception4 to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement,5 this Note attempts to shift 
the framework within which the Bin Laden court worked. Although 
Bin Laden’s acceptance of the foreign intelligence exception correctly 
prevented the court from having to exclude valuable evidence that 
helped convict an international terrorist, future courts should not be 
confined by the warrant requirement and the exclusionary rule. 
Instead, this Note proposes that the Constitution does not 
require a warrant for searches and seizures of Americans abroad, 
whether the searches are for foreign intelligence gathering or normal 
criminal investigations. This proposition may at first seem an 
anathema, but Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is riddled with 
 
 2. 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 3. Id. at 275. 
 4. Foreign intelligence information is defined as information relating to, or if concerning a 
United States person, necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against attacks by 
a foreign power, sabotage or international terrorism, or intelligence activities of a foreign 
power, or, information that is related or necessary to the national defense, security, or foreign 
affairs of the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000). Foreign intelligence gathering is frequently 
contrasted with normal criminal investigations throughout this Note. 
 5. See Justin M. Sandberg, Comment, The Need for Warrants Authorizing Foreign 
Intelligence Searches of American Citizens Abroad: A Call for Formalism, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
403, 406 (2002) (supporting a categorical requirement to obtain a warrant regardless of whether 
the primary purpose of the search is foreign intelligence); Carrie Truehart, Case Comment, 
United States v. Bin Laden and the Foreign Intelligence Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
for Searches of “United States Persons” Abroad, B.U. L. REV. 555, 599 (2002) (proposing FISC 
procedures for unilateral U.S. searches of its citizens abroad). But see Constance Pfeiffer, Note, 
Feeling Insecure?: United States v. Bin Laden and the Merits of a Foreign-Intelligence Exception 
for Searches Abroad, 23 REV. LITIG. 209, 237 (2004) (concluding, with some reservations, that 
Bin Laden was correctly decided). 
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exceptions to the warrant requirement that prove it is not absolute.6 
Although a warrant is constitutionally required in many domestic 
searches, that does not lead indubitably to the conclusion that a 
warrant is required for searches outside of the United States. The 
many exceptions in modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
suggest that courts have been heavily influenced by policy 
considerations in making their constitutional pronouncements 
regarding warrants.7 Yet there is little in the text or history of the 
amendment that mandates a preference for warrants, and in the case 
of searches abroad, practical and policy considerations weigh against 
recognizing a warrant requirement. One of the central policy 
considerations behind recognizing a warrant requirement is to protect 
the privacy of American citizens against unreasonable searches, but 
this Note contends that, for searches occurring overseas, courts could 
ensure greater privacy protection by developing a more rigorous legal 
reasonableness standard8 that opens the federal government up to 
greater civil liability. 
In setting out this argument, Part I provides a brief history of the 
Fourth Amendment. Part II presents a detailed description of Bin 
Laden and the foreign intelligence exception. Part III challenges the 
 
 6. This proposition is further supported by the fact that certain well-regarded 
commentators continue to challenge the assumption that the Fourth Amendment ever requires a 
warrant. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 768 
(1994) (asserting that reasonableness, and not warrants or probable cause, is the fundamental 
value underlying the Fourth Amendment); see also William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth 
Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 885 (1991) (“The reasons for requiring warrants are 
genuine, but not strong; it is entirely plausible that the system would function better without 
them.”). Professor Stuntz ultimately concludes that requiring warrants may have some desirable 
effects, but hedges when he says that “[o]n the merits, it is hard to say with any certainty which 
choice is right.” Id. at 942. 
 7. Even supporters of the rule like Professor Donald Dripps admit that the “exclusionary 
rule cases are arbitrary.” Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional 
Law: “Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1603–08 (1996). 
Professor Dripps posits that Mapp v. Ohio, 368 U.S. 871 (1961), which extended the 
exclusionary rule beyond federal to state and local governmental bodies, forced the Supreme 
Court to use policy-driven, “reasonable suspicion” tests in evaluating the constitutionality of 
stop-and-frisks, building inspections, and other “coercive street encounters.” These types of 
searches were ordinarily the province of local police, and a harsh, inflexible application of the 
exclusionary rule would have made it extremely difficult for police to effectively perform their 
duties. Id. 
 8. Like probable cause, reasonableness “can be defined legally, in which case there will 
develop, over time, a detailed set of common-law rules for various kinds of recurring fact 
patterns. Or it can be defined factually, with the standard meaning whatever individual 
magistrates and judges say it means in particular cases.” Stuntz, supra note 6, at 927. This Note 
argues for the expansion of a legal reasonableness doctrine. 
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application of the warrant requirement to overseas searches. Finally, 
Part IV proposes that a more stringent reasonableness inquiry would 
better comport with constitutional requirements and balance liberty 
and security interests. 
I.  RELEVANT FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Over the last half century, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Fourth Amendment to require a warrant and probable cause for 
all searches and seizures, as well as the exclusion from trial of illegally 
obtained evidence.9 Nonetheless, myriad exceptions and 
qualifications puncture the general rule,10 and the amendment’s text 
does not actually require warrants: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.11 
Individually, the Justices have attacked the Court’s modern 
jurisprudence for abandoning the amendment’s historical and textual 
antecedents.12 One influential commentator has implored that “[w]e 
need to read the Amendment’s words and take them seriously: they 
 
 9. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 257, 260 (1984). 
 10. See infra notes 69–80 and accompanying text. 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 12. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The 
Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and seizures; it 
merely prohibits searches and seizures that are ‘unreasonable.’”); Nat’l Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989) (Kennedy, J.) (“[W]here a Fourth Amendment 
intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is 
necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s interests to 
determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized 
suspicion in the particular context.”); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437–38 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he so-called ‘exclusionary rule’ created by this Court imposes a 
burden out of all proportion to the Fourth Amendment values which it seeks to advance by 
seriously impeding the efforts of the national, state, and local governments to apprehend and 
convict those who have violated their laws.”); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) 
(Rehnquist, J.) (“Although vehicles are ‘effects’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses 
and cars.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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do not require warrants, probable cause or exclusion of evidence, but 
they do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable.”13 
The Supreme Court has never considered the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment to Americans abroad, but the amendment likely 
applies in at least some form. In Reid v. Covert,14 an Air Force 
sergeant’s wife was convicted in a military tribunal for the murder of 
her husband while stationed in England.15 The Supreme Court 
granted the defendant’s application for a writ of habeas corpus, 
proclaiming that the Constitution guaranteed her a jury trial because 
“the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the 
Constitution provide to protect [one’s] life and liberty should not be 
stripped away just because [one] happens to be in another land.”16 
Nonetheless, only a plurality joined Justice Black’s opinion. Justice 
Harlan’s controlling concurrence extended Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment protections to the defendant, but rejected the plurality’s 
sweeping language claiming that the Bill of Rights operates 
unconditionally abroad: “I cannot agree with the suggestion that 
every provision of the Constitution must always be deemed 
automatically applicable to American citizens in every part of the 
world.”17 
More recently, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,18 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist concluded for a divided Court that a Mexican 
criminal suspect could not invoke the Fourth Amendment to 
challenge a search and seizure, because the amendment’s drafters did 
not contemplate nonresident aliens within “the people” that it would 
protect.19 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence explicitly rejected Justice 
Rehnquist’s categorical exclusion for a more flexible approach, 
echoing Justice Harlan’s statement in Reid that “the question of 
which specific safeguards . . . are appropriately to be applied in a 
particular context . . . can be reduced to the issue of what process is 
‘due’ a defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular 
case.”20 Still, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, and 
 
 13. Amar, supra note 6, at 759. 
 14. 354 U.S. 1. 
 15. Id. at 3. 
 16. Id. at 6. 
 17. Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 18. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 19. Id. at 265 (1990). 
 20. Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring), cited in Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 
278. 
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Stevens are in most instances careful to qualify their limitations on 
the Fourth Amendment to nonresident aliens.21 These careful 
delineations make it likely that the Court views citizens living abroad, 
in contrast to nonresident aliens, as part of “the people.” Thus, the 
Supreme Court would likely hold that at least some elements of the 
Fourth Amendment apply to Americans abroad, even though it has 
not yet confronted the question directly.22 
II.  UNITED STATES V. BIN LADEN  
AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE EXCEPTION 
Bin Laden remains the only case that has directly addressed the 
question of whether the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to 
conduct foreign intelligence surveillance on Americans overseas. It is 
instructive to consider the methodology underlying Bin Laden 
because many of the arguments that support a foreign intelligence 
exception to the warrant requirement also support the broader 
argument in Parts III and IV that this requirement should not be 
automatically applied overseas. Following a brief recitation of Bin 
Laden’s facts and holding, Section A reviews the constitutional and 
practical bases relied upon by Judge Leonard B. Sand in this case. 
Section B examines Judge Sand’s application of the foreign 
intelligence exception to the surveillance of El-Hage. Section C 
explores Judge Sand’s refusal to exclude evidence. Finally, Section D 
 
 21. Despite the general care to confine the holding only to nonresident aliens, Justice 
Rehnquist does note that “the drafting of the Fourth Amendment also suggests that its purpose 
was to restrict searches and seizures which might be conducted by the United States in domestic 
matters.” Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added). Whether this foreshadows 
restricting the Fourth Amendment to domestic situations even when an American citizen is 
involved remains to be seen. 
 22. See id. (“[T]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the 
United States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggested that the 
provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside 
of the United States territory.”); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 249 
(1960) (“[A civilian dependent stationed abroad] is protected by the specific provisions of 
Article III [of the Constitution] and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments . . . .”); Reid, 354 U.S. at 
40–41 (“[U]nder our Constitution courts of law alone are given power to try civilians for their 
offenses against the United States.”); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1966) 
(“[W]e think it clear . . . that the Fourth Amendment is violated by a general search [of one’s 
home].”); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir. 1965) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to arrests and searches made by [foreign] officials in [a foreign 
country] for violation of [foreign] law, even if the persons arrested are Americans and American 
police officers gave information leading to the arrest and search.”). 
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discusses the cursory review given to the reasonableness of the search 
in Bin Laden. 
The defendant on trial in Bin Laden, Lebanese-born Wadih El-
Hage, had emigrated to the United States, become a citizen, attended 
college at the University of Southwestern Louisiana, and lived in 
Arlington, Texas with his American wife and children.23 His ties to 
Usama Bin Laden eventually caused him to move to Kenya, where 
the United States intelligence community secretly monitored five 
telephone lines linked to Al-Qaeda from August 1996 through 1997, 
some of which El-Hage used.24 The attorney general did not authorize 
intelligence gathering aimed specifically at El-Hage himself until 
April of 1997.25 On August 21, 1997, American and Kenyan 
intelligence officials, including one FBI agent,26 jointly searched El-
Hage’s residence and seized a computer with contents linking him to 
the 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania.27 Kenyan authorities presented El-Hage’s wife with a 
Kenyan warrant, but no U.S. warrant was ever obtained, and the 
United States explicitly disavowed relying on the Kenyan warrant for 
authority.28 
El-Hage moved to suppress the evidence gained from electronic 
surveillance and the search of his home on the grounds that it was 
obtained without a warrant and, alternatively, that the searches were 
unreasonable.29 Judge Leonard B. Sand ultimately held that: (1) the 
Fourth Amendment and its warrant requirement applies to 
Americans abroad;30 (2) an exception to the warrant requirement 
exists for foreign intelligence searches;31 (3) any evidence obtained 
prior to the attorney general’s authorization to specifically target El-
 
 23. Oriana Zill, A Portrait of Wadih El Hage, Accused Terrorist, FRONTLINE, Sept. 12, 
2001, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/elhage.html. 
 24. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 25. Id. 
 26. This is notable because the common perception of the FBI is that it is a domestic law 
enforcement and intelligence agency, while the CIA focuses on foreign intelligence. In actual 
practice, this dichotomy does not always hold true. See RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING 
SURPRISE ATTACKS 31 (2005) (“[B]efore 9/11 the CIA and the FBI exaggerated the degree to 
which they were forbidden to share information . . . .”). 
 27. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 268–69. 
 28. Id. at 269. 
 29. Id. at 270. 
 30. Id. at 270–71. 
 31. Id. at 275. 
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Hage did not fit under this exception and was therefore unlawful;32 (4) 
the exclusionary rule did not, however, apply to this unlawfully 
obtained evidence;33 and (5) both the electronic surveillance and the 
physical search of El-Hage’s home were reasonable.34 Thus, El-Hage’s 
motion to suppress evidence was denied.35 
A. The Constitutional and Practical Bases for a Foreign  
Intelligence Exception 
Judge Sand relied on the broadest language in the Reid and 
Verdugo-Urquidez opinions to permit El-Hage to assert a Fourth 
Amendment challenge, implicitly assuming that a warrant 
requirement exists overseas, but he ultimately determined that the 
warrant requirement was inapplicable under the Bin Laden facts.36 
Prior to the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) in 1978,37 four circuits had held that a U.S. citizen could 
be searched without a warrant, provided that there was probable 
cause to suspect that person was an agent of a foreign power and that 
the investigation was not for normal criminal purposes.38 However, 
these holdings only addressed Americans within the United States, 
and the Second Circuit had not confronted the question of whether 
Americans could be searched without a warrant for foreign 
intelligence purposes. Therefore, Judge Sand articulated the 
exception by blending constitutional and practical justifications within 
three main categories: the president’s constitutional power over 
foreign affairs, the policy costs of imposing a warrant requirement, 
and the absence of a warrant procedure. 
Judge Sand’s conclusion that the president has broad 
constitutional powers over foreign affairs and intelligence collection is 
well supported by precedent,39 as is the fact that prior to FISA 
 
 32. Id. at 280–81 
 33. Id. at 281. 
 34. Id. at 284–86. 
 35. Id. at 288. 
 36. Id. at 270, 279. 
 37. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1863 (2000). 
 38. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d 
Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 39. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (discussing 
the “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations”); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 
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“[w]arrantless foreign intelligence collection ha[d] been an 
established practice of the Executive Branch for decades.”40 FISA 
changed this practice for Americans within the United States, 
requiring intelligence officials to obtain authorization from both the 
attorney general as well as a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) before investigating.41 Judge Sand viewed the fact that FISA 
did not address intelligence collection on Americans abroad, as well 
as the Supreme Court’s silence on the issue, as favoring wide 
executive latitude.42 
Judge Sand then switched to practical considerations, recognizing 
that any warrant requirement has frequently been disregarded when 
it “proves to be a disproportionate and perhaps even disabling burden 
on the Executive.”43 He asserted that requiring judicial approval in 
advance would decrease the speed of executive response to foreign 
intelligence threats, as well as increase the likelihood of security 
breaches, because the executive would have to take the judiciary into 
its confidence.44 Judge Sand accepted the government’s arguments 
that at a preliminary stage, courts would have great difficulty in 
measuring the impact of their decisions on U.S. foreign policy and 
cooperative relations with other governments. He also noted that 
 
(1875) (recognizing the president’s power to conduct intelligence operations and to employ 
secret agents). 
 40. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (quoting William F. Brown & Americo R. 
Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 
12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 103 (1985) (“‘Warrantless electronic 
surveillance has been used by the Executive to collect intelligence information since at least the 
mid-1800s . . . . Warrantless physical searches have been used for a much longer period of 
time.’”)). 
 41. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(b) (2000). 
 42. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have 
also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the 
structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the 
President by § 1 of Art. II.”)); see also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 
321–22 (1972) (holding that there is no warrant exception for domestic security surveillances but 
“express[ing] no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of 
foreign powers or their agents”). 
 43. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 273–74. Judge Sand also cited searches by probation 
officers, as in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987), and searches related to the 
regulation of railroad employees, as in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489 
U.S. 602, 619 (1989), as exceptions to the search warrant requirement outside of the foreign 
affairs context. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
 44. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 275. 
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requiring notification to certain governments that might be hostile to 
the United States could be ruinous.45 Judge Sand used FISA’s 
legislative history as evidence that Congress recognized these 
difficulties and consequently limited FISA’s reach to searches within 
U.S. borders.46 For instance, then-Attorney General Griffin Bell 
noted that because “there is a fair degree of cooperation between our 
Government and the police and intelligence services of other 
nations . . . . limitations on [overseas] surveillances could result in the 
loss of cooperation.”47 
Similarly, Judge Sand cited the absence of any statutory basis to 
issue a warrant abroad as a reason supporting the foreign intelligence 
exception. He relied on Verdugo-Urquidez’s statement that a warrant 
from an American magistrate “‘would be a dead letter outside the 
United States’” to refute El-Hage’s argument that the U.S. must 
abide by its own constitutional limitations in order to exercise 
jurisdiction extra-territorially.48 While Judge Sand did not accept the 
proposition that obtaining a warrant for a foreign search would be 
impossible, he stated that it would “certainly have been 
impracticable” given the absence of a statutory basis, the unsuitability 
of traditional procedures to foreign intelligence collection, and the 
risk that sensitive information could be publicly revealed.49 
B. Adopting and Applying the Foreign Intelligence Exception 
After declaring the legality of a foreign intelligence exception, 
Judge Sand closely mirrored the procedures outlined in FISA for 
surveillance of Americans within U.S. borders to determine whether 
the exception would apply to El-Hage’s situation. In doing so, he 
required that there be probable cause to suspect that the defendant is 
an agent of a foreign power; that the searches or seizures be 
primarily50 for foreign intelligence purposes; and that the searches 
 
 45. Id. at 274. 
 46. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 7 n.2 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3790, 
3796, and H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 27–28 (1978)). 
 47. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearing on S. 1566 Before the Subcomm. 
on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 
12–13 (1978). 
 48. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 
U.S. 259, 278 (1990)). 
 49. Id. at 277. 
 50. This requirement is more closely analogous to FISA’s standard prior to passage of the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
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first be authorized by the president or attorney general.51 He 
determined that the surveillance and physical search of El-Hage’s 
home satisfied each of these requirements, except for the electronic 
surveillance that was conducted prior to April 1997, when the 
attorney general first authorized intelligence collection aimed 
specifically at El-Hage.52 After a lengthy analysis, Judge Sand ruled 
that the electronic surveillance of El-Hage prior to April, 1997 was 
not merely incidental to the efforts directed at Al-Qaeda, and that El-
Hage had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home that could 
only be abrogated by attorney general authorization.53 The 
surveillance conducted prior to April 1997 was therefore unlawful 
and necessitated consideration under the exclusionary rule.54 
C. Refusing to Employ the Exclusionary Rule 
Judge Sand announced that the main purpose of the exclusionary 
rule, which holds that evidence obtained in contravention of the 
Fourth Amendment may not be used against a defendant at trial, is to 
deter overzealous searches by government agents.55 He pointed to the 
exclusionary rule’s prudential rather than constitutional nature, and 
decided that excluding the evidence at issue would serve no deterrent 
purpose because the intelligence officials were motivated to catch Bin 
Laden, and “surveillance would have been conducted even if there 
had been an awareness that the material recorded would be 
inadmissible at a future criminal trial of El-Hage.”56 Judge Sand also 
noted that “‘the Court, in recent years, has refused to apply the rule 
to situations where it would achieve little or no deterrence.’”57 
 
Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). FISA 
previously required that to apply to FISC for an order to conduct foreign intelligence 
surveillance on Americans within the United States, the attorney general first had to find that 
the “purpose of the search is to obtain foreign intelligence information.” 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000). The Patriot Act changed that language to “a significant 
purpose,” thereby enabling FISC to issue an order for some searches that would be expected to 
garner normal criminal investigative information, as well as foreign intelligence. Id. (after 2001 
change) (emphasis added). 
 51. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 277. 
 52. Id. at 279. 
 53. Id. at 279–82. 
 54. Id. at 282. 
 55. Id. at 283. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (quoting United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
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In addition, Judge Sand applied the exclusionary rule’s “good 
faith exception,” which originally applied in the case of an invalid 
warrant,58 to El-Hage’s situation. Because intelligence officials 
“operated under an actual and reasonable belief that Attorney 
General approval was not required prior to April 4, 1997,” Judge 
Sand offered good faith as an independent rationale against 
exclusion.59 
D. Assessing the Reasonableness of the El-Hage Search 
Finally, Judge Sand addressed the reasonableness of the searches 
in Bin Laden and summarily concluded that the warrantless physical 
search of El-Hage’s home as well as the wiretaps, which were 
operated continuously for a year, were reasonable. Judge Sand 
determined the search of El-Hage’s home was reasonable in its scope 
because it was performed during the daytime, the American official 
present identified himself in true name to El-Hage’s wife, and the 
only items searched were those believed to have foreign intelligence 
value.60 The long-term, continuous electronic surveillance was 
reasonable because of the covert and diffuse nature of terrorist 
groups, the fact that the conversations were in a foreign language, 
which made it likely that some could be in code, and the fact that 
known Al-Qaeda members regularly used El-Hage’s phones.61 Judge 
Sand also rejected El-Hage’s assertion that warrantless residential 
searches were only permissible “in cases of exigency,” instead 
allowing them “where a special need of the government is shown.”62 
III.  CHALLENGING THE APPLICATION OF THE  
WARRANT REQUIREMENT TO OVERSEAS SEARCHES 
Judge Sand was likely correct when he applied the Fourth 
Amendment to American citizens abroad, but he proceeded under 
the assumption that an exception to the warrant requirement would 
be needed in order for evidence against El-Hage to be admissible.63 
As a result, twenty-four pages of his opinion are spent expounding a 
 
 58. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 
 59. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 284. 
 60. Id. at 285. 
 61. Id. at 286. 
 62. Id. at 285. 
 63. Id. at 270–71. 
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foreign intelligence exception, defending surveillance without a 
warrant, and twisting the exclusionary rule to admit “unlawful” 
evidence into the trial. Fewer than three pages at the end of the 
opinion concern the reasonableness of the searches. 
This Note suggests that instead of assuming a warrant 
requirement exists and then looking for an exception, future courts 
should re-examine the meaning of the Warrant Clause and conclude 
that a warrant is not required to search American citizens abroad. As 
an alternative to requiring warrants, more weight should be given to 
the Reasonableness Clause. As a result, Fourth Amendment 
violations should be remedied not with the impractical exclusion of 
critical evidence, but with damages against those government actors 
who conduct unreasonable searches and seizures. Section A of this 
Part addresses the constitutional underpinnings and precedent 
regarding warrants before Part B turns to the practical consequences 
of administering them overseas. 
A. Neither Precedent nor the Constitution Require a Warrant to 
Conduct Searches Overseas 
Yale Professor Akhil Reed Amar has argued persuasively that 
the Fourth Amendment does not require any warrants at all, but 
limits them so that whatever warrants are issued must have probable 
cause and particularity.64 The amendment’s text and historical 
antecedents support this position. “The Framers did not exalt 
warrants, for a warrant was issued ex parte by a government official 
on the imperial payroll and had the purpose and effect of precluding 
any common law trespass suit . . . after the search or seizure 
occurred.”65 In the United States’ early years, citizen targets could 
bring trespass suits and receive jury trials when officials unlawfully 
searched or seized their person or property.66 In response, federal 
officials sought broad warrants because they provided absolute 
immunity from lawsuits. “Warrants then, were friends of the searcher, 
not the searched.”67 As a result, revolutionary Americans were 
skeptical of warrants, numerous early judges were aware of their 
immunizing potential, and even some modern Justices have 
 
 64. Amar, supra note 6, at 762, 771. 
 65. Id. at 771–72. 
 66. Id. at 774. 
 67. Id. 
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recognized their history of aggrandizing governmental power rather 
than protecting the citizen:68 
Far from restricting the constable’s arrest power, the institution of 
the warrant was used to expand that authority by giving the 
constable delegated powers of a superior officer such as a justice of 
the peace. Hence at the time of the Bill of Rights, the warrant 
functioned as a powerful tool of law enforcement rather than as a 
protection for the rights of criminal suspects.69 
In addition, the so-called warrant requirement is clearly a 
misnomer in that it is not absolute70 and there is a laundry list of 
searches and seizures that either historically or currently do not 
require a warrant, including arrests in public places,71 searches 
pursuant to arrests,72 exigent circumstances,73 consent searches,74 plain 
view searches,75 automobile searches,76 searches of vessels on the high 
seas,77 and foreign intelligence searches.78 Americans are also 
regularly subjected to constitutional warrantless searches in their 
everyday lives, whether they are in public schools,79 crossing national 
borders,80 or on airlines81—searches which have become particularly 
intrusive in the aftermath of 9/11. 
 
 68. Id. at 774, 778. For a more detailed and illuminating account of the historical 
underpinnings of the per se unreasonableness of broad warrants, see id. at 771–81. 
 69. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 607–08 (1980) (White, J., dissenting, joined by 
Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.). 
 70. Even Professor Dripps admits that “the warrant requirement is now pretty clearly 
confined to private premises,” though he cautions against its abandonment. Dripps, supra note 
7, at 1608. 
 71. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421–23 (1976). 
 72. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223–24 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 762–63 (1969). 
 73. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294, 298–300 (1967). 
 74. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 
169–71 (1974). 
 75. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987). 
 76. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977). 
 77. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 78. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 
1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 79. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–43 (1985). 
 80. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564–66 (1976). 
 81. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989). 
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Thus, even if one does not accept Amar’s theory in its entirety, 
the Fourth Amendment’s history and text, as well as Supreme Court 
precedent itself, demonstrate that the current Warrant Clause 
jurisprudence is largely adjudicated on a fact-specific, case-by-case 
basis and hinges primarily on practical and policy considerations. 
Because neither the text nor the history of the Fourth Amendment 
suggest that warrants should be required for all searches, there is no 
reason that future courts must interpret the Fourth Amendment to 
require warrants overseas.82 Undoubtedly, some people will resist this 
proposition, especially when they consider its scope: refusing to 
require warrants overseas would apply equally to surveillance 
activities aimed at collecting foreign intelligence as well as to 
collecting traditional criminal information. Yet before this idea is 
tossed away as a heavy-handed apology for unlimited intrusions upon 
privacy by Big Brother, one should understand that, unlike in the 
domestic context, U.S. judicial warrants are not routinely used for 
surveillance overseas; instead, American authorities normally rely on 
the pre-search protections of the host nation. In fact, there is no 
statutory authority for courts to issue such extraterritorial warrants, 
and prior to Bin Laden, no criminal case had considered whether a 
warrant was required for overseas searches.83 
B. Requiring Warrants Overseas is Bad Policy and  
Administratively Impractical 
Requiring a warrant to search or seize Americans overseas raises 
numerous practical and policy problems that may actually decrease 
the security of Americans abroad and within the United States. The 
most glaring administrative problem is that Rule 41 of the Federal 
 
 82. Recall Justice Harlan’s eloquent explanation that not all clauses of the Constitution 
apply equally in an overseas context. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., 
concurring); see also Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, Coordinated Criminal 
Investigations Between the United States and Foreign Governments and Their Implications for 
American Constitutional Rights, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 821, 822 (2002) (“[W]hile some constitutional 
restrictions apply in the same manner whether the United States acts abroad or domestically, 
other constitutional provisions are modified or rendered inapplicable when the United States 
acts abroad.”). 
 83. Prior to the enactment of FISA, a federal district court did rule in a civil suit for 
damages that a warrant was required to wiretap Americans living in West Germany and that the 
plaintiffs had causes of action under the First and Sixth Amendments. Berlin Democratic Club 
v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 158–60 (D.D.C. 1976). That court, however, was not faced with 
the warrant requirement’s onerous consequence of having to decide whether to exclude 
evidence of severe criminality. 
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Rules of Criminal Procedure limits the jurisdiction of a federal 
magistrate to the issuance of domestic warrants.84 The Supreme Court 
considered but chose not to adopt a proposed amendment to Rule 
41(a) that would have allowed for the issuance of “warrants to search 
property outside the United States.”85 Thus, the Supreme Court’s 
previous statement that any warrant from an American magistrate 
“would be a dead letter outside the United States” still holds true.86 
This statement might be regarded as a direct refutation of any 
warrant requirement reaching overseas. Yet at the very least, it 
exposes an internal inconsistency in Judge Sand’s opinion due to his 
reliance on a domestic Fourth Amendment framework: on one hand 
he relies heavily on the absence of an administrative warrant 
procedure to justify an exception, but on the other he implies that a 
warrant might be required if the surveillance was for a normal 
criminal investigation instead of foreign intelligence.87 Yet if a warrant 
would be a “dead letter,” it would undoubtedly be so in either 
context. 
Congress could possibly rectify the current absence of a statutory 
basis by requiring a preclearance procedure in the United States for 
overseas searches and seizures; even if that procedure would be a 
“dead letter” in foreign nations, it might serve as a check on our 
government’s criminal and intelligence agents. Yet the fact that 
 
 84. FED R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (1994): Authority to Issue a Warrant. At the request of a federal 
law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government: 
(1) a magistrate judge with authority in the district—or if none is reasonably 
available, a judge of a state court of record in the district—has authority to issue a 
warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the district; 
(2) a magistrate judge with authority in the district has authority to issue a warrant for 
a person or property outside the district if the person or property is located within the 
district when the warrant is issued but might move or be moved outside the district 
before the warrant is executed; and 
(3) a magistrate judge—in an investigation of domestic terrorism or international 
terrorism (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331)—having authority in any district in which 
activities related to the terrorism may have occurred, may issue a warrant for a 
person or property within or outside that district. 
 85. FED R. CRIM. P. 41(a) cmt. (1994). Interestingly, in United States v. Moussaoui, 365 
F.3d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 2004), the Fourth Circuit indicated that judges do have authority to 
compel the testimony of witnesses who are abroad, but absolutely no mention was made of 
warrants. In the absence of statutory authority, a common law theory granting jurisdiction may 
be inconsistent with Rule 41(a)’s limitations on jurisdiction. 
 86. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990). 
 87. See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting 
the government’s assertion that it would be impossible to secure a warrant for overseas searches 
and discussing the possibility of courts issuing a warrant without statutory authority based on 
their common law powers). 
06__THEN.DOC 10/4/2006  1:10 PM 
2006] WARRANT CLAUSE 1075 
Congress has never bothered to enact such legislation, and has 
explicitly rejected extending FISA-like procedures to overseas 
intelligence gathering,88 counsels against now finding a constitutional 
requirement of warrants overseas. Even if Congress were to change 
its course and extend FISA-like protections overseas, it is only logical 
to assume, as Judge Sand did in Bin Laden, that Americans abroad 
would not be given greater protection than Americans within the 
United States who fall under FISC jurisdiction. A constitutional 
requirement of warrants overseas, however, would do just that for 
foreign intelligence targets, because four circuits have already 
determined that a warrant is not required for Americans within the 
country.89 And FISC’s “rubberstamp”90 approval of Justice 
Department requests for secret warrants—1,128 granted out of 1,128 
requests in 2002,91 11,883 warrants with zero denials between 1978 and 
1999,92 and only two substantive modifications out of over 13,000 
approved warrants in the court’s first twenty-two years of 
operation93—is evidence that the procedural protections of a warrant 
(or something like it) might not be that great, at least for foreign 
intelligence targets.94 
 
 88. “[L]egislation [governing foreign intelligence surveillance abroad] should be 
considered separately because the issues are different than those posed by electronic 
surveillance within the United States.” S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 7 n.2 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3970, 3976 (“[C]ertain problems and unique characteristics preclude the simple 
extension of [FISA] to overseas surveillances.”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 27–28 (1978). 
 89. See supra note 38. 
 90. Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to 
Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1627 (2004). 
 91. Tanya Weinberg, PATRIOT Act Initiatives Disturb Civil Libertarians, FORT 
LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, May 11, 2003, at B1. 
 92. Lawrence D. Sloan, Note, ECHELON and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence: 
A Need for Reevaluation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1467, 1496 (2001); see also Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, FISA Orders 1979–2004, http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/ 
fisa_stats.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2006) (presenting similar statistics). 
 93. Stewart M. Powell, Secret Court Modified Wiretap Requests, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 24, 2005, at A9, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/ 
253334_nsaspying24.html. 
 94. In 2005 it was revealed that the Bush administration authorized National Security 
Agency (NSA) surveillance of myriad overseas communications by terror suspects located 
within the U.S. without requesting warrants from FISC. Eric Lichtblau, Bush Defends Spy 
Program and Denies Misleading Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2006, at A11. Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales claimed that President Bush approved the program because the FISA court’s 
approval process was too cumbersome but defended the program’s legality. Powell, supra note 
93, at A9. One report indicates that in 2003 and 2004, FISC ordered “substantive modifications” 
to 173 surveillance requests, when only two had been modified in the court’s first twenty-two 
years. Id. It also rejected six requests for warrants—the first outright rejections in FISC’s 
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In addition to these considerable practical difficulties, instituting 
a warrant requirement for overseas searches could be seriously 
detrimental to national security. Judge Sand detailed some of these 
dangers in formulating the foreign intelligence exception in Bin 
Laden: requiring law enforcement and intelligence agents located 
overseas to communicate with judicial authorities back in the United 
States or foreign judicial authorities would decrease the speed of the 
executive response,95 increase the risk of security breaches, and could 
undermine cooperative relationships with other nations.96 Needless to 
say, the danger emanating from these possibilities is magnified 
beyond ordinary proportions when dealing with terrorists rather than 
ordinary domestic criminals. 
Furthermore, in an intelligence context, the incentives created by 
careerism, loyalty to one’s own agency, and a rational fear that 
important information will be leaked already result in a tendency to 
hoard rather than share information amongst the nation’s fifteen 
separate intelligence agencies.97 The fact that intelligence agencies are 
reluctant to share amongst themselves foreshadows the considerable 
difficulty of forcing them to share with judges. Further, being 
required to share sensitive information with a magistrate judge in 
order to obtain a warrant may cause agencies to forego searches that 
should be conducted. For instance, FBI headquarters refused to 
follow the advice of one of its field offices to search the laptop of 
Zacarias Moussaoui because it thought its request for a warrant 
would be rejected.98  
 
history—prompting the Bush administration to unilaterally bypass FISA. Id. While this 
indicates that the existence of FISC may have prevented previous administrations from pursuing 
surveillance programs blatantly outside of FISA’s provisions, it should also be remembered that 
Congress explicitly disavowed instituting a system similar to FISA for surveillance taking place 
overseas. In addition, the Clinton administration also maintained that it had authority to 
conduct warrantless domestic searches for foreign intelligence purposes. Former Deputy 
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on July 
14, 1994 that “[t]he Department of Justice believes, and the case law supports, that the president 
has inherent authority to conduct warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence 
purposes . . . and that the President may, as has been done, delegate this authority to the 
Attorney General.” Byron York, Clinton Claimed Authority to Order No-Warrant Searches, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Dec. 20, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york 
200512200946.asp. 
 95. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 273–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See generally POSNER, supra note 26. Posner cautions that due to the lack of knowledge 
available to the public about certain agencies, this number is a close estimate. 
 98. Id. at 30. 
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Finally, by accepting a warrant requirement and then declaring 
an exception to it, Judge Sand was forced to address the attendant 
exclusionary rule and devise yet another exception. Exclusion of 
evidence as a remedy to a Fourth Amendment violation has been 
attacked on historical and practical grounds, including the fact that it 
was unheard of in early America,99 that it does not enhance judicial 
integrity and fairness,100 and that an illegal search is rarely a but-for 
cause of the introduction of evidence.101 Seeking to deter the 
government by rewarding a criminal defendant with the windfall of 
excluding culpatory evidence treats him like “a private attorney 
general. But the worst kind.”102 “He is self-selected and self-serving. 
He is often unrepresentative of the larger class of law-abiding 
citizens . . . . [H]e is often despised by the public, the class he 
implicitly is supposed to represent. . . . He is . . . an awkward 
champion of the Fourth Amendment.”103 While the exclusionary rule 
does have its notable defenders in the domestic context,104 like the 
warrant requirement, it is not absolute and is pockmarked with 
 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 843–44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) 
(No. 15,551). In this circuit opinion, future Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story remarked that 
[T]he right of using evidence does not depend . . . upon the lawfulness or 
unlawfulness of the mode, by which it is obtained. . . . [E]specially on trials for crimes, 
evidence is often obtained . . . by force or by contrivances . . . . Yet I am not aware, 
that such evidence has upon that account ever been dismissed for incompetency. 
Id. 
 100. Professor Amar points out that courts in England and many other countries reject the 
exclusionary rule, as do American courts in civil cases, yet they are not considered unfair or 
lacking integrity. Amar, supra note 6, at 792; see also John Kaplan, The Limits of the 
Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (1974) (describing the rejection of the 
exclusionary rule in other countries besides the United States). 
 101. Amar, supra note 6, at 794–95. Since magistrates are more lenient in granting warrants 
than courts are in reviewing them, often a police force that would have been able to obtain a 
warrant but failed to apply for one under the belief that the search would fit a judicial exception 
will later lose the evidence to the exclusionary rule. When a magistrate would have insulated the 
search from review by granting a warrant, a subsequent judicial application of the exclusionary 
rule does not mean the illegality of the search was a but-for cause of the introduction of the 
evidence. 
 102. Id. at 796. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 
319, 321–22. In explaining his reluctant acceptance of the exclusionary rule, Traynor said: 
[I]llegal searches and seizures [became] a routine procedure subject to no effective 
deterrent . . . . It was one thing to condone an occasional constable’s blunder, to 
accept his illegally obtained evidence so that the guilty would not go free. It was quite 
another to condone a steady course of illegal police procedures that deliberately and 
flagrantly violated the Constitution of the United States . . . . 
Id. at 322. 
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exceptions.105 Even if the exclusionary rule is considered the better of 
imperfect options in the domestic context, its deficiencies are 
significantly magnified when applied to terrorists like El-Hage due to 
the enormous damage terrorists can inflict upon the nation. 
Even though the evidence against El-Hage was not ultimately 
excluded, the Bin Laden methodology—an approach that requires 
judges to call evidence “unlawful” and then find a loophole to admit 
it—might itself decrease security. Within military and intelligence 
circles, the concept of “lawfare” has emerged.106 Nations and terrorist 
groups hostile to the United States have realized that they can no 
longer compete with American military might. Understanding the 
respect for law in Western societies, they seek instead to gain tactical 
advantages by altering worldwide perception of the legality of the 
U.S. government’s actions.107 Though the concept of lawfare is 
primarily thought of as a tool to disrupt tactical operations in full 
scale wars, its logic also extends to intelligence gathering and joint 
criminal investigations between the United States and foreign 
countries. Just as “perceptions of illegalities can have real operational 
effects”108 in war, they may also erode the willingness of foreign 
countries to cooperate in surveillance activities and of United States 
citizens to support them. Al-Qaeda and organized crime are keenly 
aware of this potential.109 Thus, headlines like CNN’s the day after Bin 
Laden was announced, which proclaimed, “Judge says illegal phone 
 
 105. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967) (holding the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement applicable to “mere evidence” found by police while 
searching for the defendant); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (holding 
admissible a conversation obtained through the defendant’s misplaced trust in an informant); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (holding that Fifth Amendment privilege does 
not protect physical evidence); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 620 (1965) (refusing to give 
Mapp retroactive effect; implicitly but conclusively rejecting a Fifth Amendment rationale for 
the exclusionary rule). 
 106. See Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, Presentation at Duke University 
School of Law: Beating Law Books Into Swords: An Airman’s Perspective on Law, Lawyers, 
and the Rise of ‘Lawfare’ in Modern Conflicts (Apr. 7, 2005). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. For example, organized crime has attacked the ability of Colombian leaders to 
cooperate in international efforts to reduce the trafficking of drugs by staining them with the 
perception of participation in illegal activities. “In a country where kingpin rebels live by 
intimidation and bribery, it would not be surprising to find peasants turning up in Colombian 
courts to press false charges–anonymously–against the most capable military leaders. Indeed, 
there is proof that is happening.” Mary Anastasia O’Grady, What About Colombia’s Terrorists?, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2001, at A17. 
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taps can be used in bomb trial,”110 are self-imposed injuries that would 
be avoided with a different judicial approach to the Fourth 
Amendment.111 
The Bin Laden methodology runs into yet another difficulty 
when one recognizes that classifying an individual as an agent of a 
foreign power is becoming exceedingly difficult.112 Terrorist groups 
like Al-Qaeda have responded to the war on terror by morphing 
themselves from centralized, hierarchical organizations to 
decentralized, entrepreneurial, terrorist individuals.113 As a result, 
intelligence officials may suspect an individual of terrorist activities 
but never be able to show that he is an agent of a foreign power. 
Under the Bin Laden methodology, warrantless surveillance of this 
new breed of unaffiliated terrorists might not fit under the foreign 
intelligence exception, so the entire surveillance effort would be 
termed unlawful, and future courts would be faced with the same 
awkward predicament of whether to exclude incriminating evidence 
or fashion a convoluted exception. 
Thus, the history, text, and precedent surrounding the Fourth 
Amendment do not compel an overseas warrant requirement, and 
numerous practical and policy difficulties make it impractical and 
potentially dangerous to implement. Instead, the personal liberty that 
the Fourth Amendment aims to protect can be better safeguarded 
with a more stringent reasonableness standard that is enforced by a 
damages remedy. 
 
 110. CNN.com, Judge Says Illegal Phone Taps Can Be Used in Bomb Trial, http://archives. 
cnn.com/2000/US/12/19/embassy.bombings.ap/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 111. In no way does the author intimate that freedom of the press should be infringed to 
prevent unsavory headlines. Rather, the argument is simply that Judge Sand’s characterization 
of the evidence as unlawfully obtained is incorrect. 
 112. Heather MacDonald, John M. Olin Fellow, Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research, 
Remarks at Duke University School of Law, Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security, and 
the Program in Public Law: Strategies for the War on Terrorism: Taking Stock (Apr. 7, 2005). 
 113. See Jessica Stern, The Protean Enemy, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2003, at 27, 34 
(providing a compelling account of Al-Qaeda’s “Protean nature,” encouragement of leaderless 
“virtual network[s]” and “lone-wolf terrorists,” and ability to avoid detection by gaming law 
enforcement agencies); see also Jonathan Kay, Terror Goes Po-Mo, NAT’L POST (CANADA), 
Sept. 27, 2003, available at http://memri.org/bin/media.cgi?ID=61603 (summarizing presentation 
of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at “Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, 
Scenarios and Future Threats” conference in Herzliya, Israel in September of 2003). 
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IV.  FORMULATING A NEW APPROACH 
In order to overcome some of the difficulties in using the Bin 
Laden methodology for searches of Americans abroad, this Part 
offers suggestions for a new judicial application of the Fourth 
Amendment overseas. The majority of the ideas come from the 
existing debate in the domestic context, but their application to 
overseas searches may be particularly helpful in addressing the 
differing practical considerations as well as security and liberty 
interests that must be balanced overseas. Section A discusses a 
stronger reasonableness standard, and Section B contours a potential 
damages remedy. These ideas are offered as a first start for 
commentators and judges to build upon and improve in thinking 
about a new approach to the Fourth Amendment overseas. 
A. A Stronger Reasonableness Standard 
The cursory review of the reasonableness of the searches in Bin 
Laden is again worth noting, as it accounts for a mere two and-one-
half pages in a twenty-six-page opinion. Under current Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, this is not surprising: “Because of the 
[Supreme] Court’s preoccupation with warrants . . . the Justices have 
spent surprisingly little time self-consciously reflecting on what, 
exactly, makes for a substantively unreasonable search or seizure.”114 
The full answer to what constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure 
will depend upon future courts giving it greater weight and spending 
more time grappling with the issue in relation to specific scenarios. 
Nonetheless, this Part sets out certain elements of searches and 
seizures of Americans abroad that are immediately identifiable as 
important to a reasonableness analysis, and concludes with a 
discussion of potential damages remedies. 
First, future courts should consider the probability of obtaining 
information from the proposed search (essentially probable cause), 
but also multiply that probability by the amount and value (together 
the “magnitude”) of that information, and then weigh the result 
against the intrusiveness of a search or seizure to the individual. If the 
intrusiveness is greater than the probability times the magnitude, then 
the search would be per se unreasonable. While perfect quantification 
of these factors is impossible, judges routinely weigh interests in 
 
 114. Amar, supra note 6, at 796, 801. 
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multiple legal contexts, from torts115 to securities regulation,116 and 
even detractors of civil remedies agree that judges could adequately 
weigh these factors.117 This need not be the only consideration under 
reasonableness, but rather a first hurdle for government officials. 
For example, in Bin Laden, intelligence officials had a very high 
probability of obtaining incriminating evidence from electronic 
surveillance because the officials had previously identified the phone 
lines as being used by Al-Qaeda members. The magnitude of the 
information that could be received was also high because of its 
potential to help prevent terrorist attacks, thereby justifying the very 
intrusive methods. In contrast, using uninterrupted electronic 
surveillance for a year to investigate a low-level American drug 
peddler would be unreasonable because the magnitude of the offense 
would not justify such a severe intrusion on privacy. 
Further, the intelligence agents in Bin Laden did eventually 
request and receive attorney general approval, and such approval 
may well emerge as a prerequisite under a reasonableness inquiry in 
order to conduct the most intrusive searches, particularly residential 
and electronic searches. Merely obtaining attorney general approval 
would not show that the search is per se reasonable—the 2005 
revelation that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales approved a 
spying program to monitor citizens’ telephone calls without 
consulting FISA cautions against such a conclusion. In fact, such 
blatant disregard of a Congressional statute would likely make the 
searches per se unreasonable. Yet requiring attorney general 
approval for highly intrusive searches does at least force attorneys 
within a presidential administration to debate the legality of the 
searches and seizures they approve. For instance, former Attorney 
General John Ashcroft reportedly refused to authorize the current 
spying program even after Gonzales implored him to approve it while 
 
 115. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1932) (establishing that failure to 
take appropriate prophylactic measures when they would cost less than the probability of an 
accident multiplied by its potential consequences results in liability for negligence). 
 116. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that, in 
insider trading cases, whether a fact is material depends upon the probability of the event’s 
occurrence multiplied by its anticipated magnitude). 
 117. Dripps, supra note 7, at 1618 (“I have little doubt that it is technically feasible to create 
effective civil remedies for Fourth Amendment violations.”); see also Berlin Democratic Club v. 
Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 162 (D.D.C. 1976) (“Questions of causation and valuation of 
damages are always thorny but never insuperable; courts traditionally have undertaken to 
answer both.”). 
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he was in the hospital with pancreatitis, and former Assistant 
Attorney General James Comey resigned over the administration’s 
decision to disregard FISA’s proscriptions.118 The attorney general 
and the Department of Justice face enormous pressure from citizens 
and the media to protect civil liberties, and in Congress’s explicit 
declination to apply FISA overseas, such pressure may offer a 
necessary check on the types of searches that are approved. Future 
administrations may learn from the harsh public criticism of President 
Bush’s abuses of power, including a rebuke from Republican Senator 
John McCain and the opening of Judiciary Committee hearings by 
Chairman and Republican Senator Arlen Specter,119 that conducting 
unreasonable searches is bad policy. 
In addition, some of the reasoning that is currently performed 
under the Warrant Clause is more appropriate under the 
Reasonableness Clause. For example, much controversy has 
surrounded the Patriot Act’s amendment to FISA that gives FISC 
jurisdiction over searches with a “significant” foreign intelligence 
purpose rather than only searches with a sole or primary foreign 
intelligence purpose.120 But this determination is exceedingly 
arbitrary, because foreign intelligence collection will often lead to 
criminal prosecutions, and it fails to consider the multiple roles that 
the intelligence agencies play.121 Making a warrant requirement hinge 
on a judicial determination of when a search’s purpose may have 
switched from foreign intelligence collection to a normal criminal 
investigation, as Bin Laden suggests is appropriate,122 places far too 
much consequence on the selection of a cutoff date. The singular 
importance of this determination would be dramatically lessened 
under a reasonableness framework. Under such a framework, a 
search that had the primary purpose of collecting foreign intelligence 
would justify more intrusiveness than a search that only had a 
 
 118. See Daniel Klaidman et al., Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 3, 2006, at 34 (describing 
the vigorous debate amongst high-level White House attorneys over what types of surveillance 
fall within the president’s powers). 
 119. Adam Nagourney, Seeking Edge in Spy Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at A1. 
 120. Compare Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1627 (“The broad definition of terrorism and 
the government’s power to use FISA for law enforcement is especially troubling because the 
Patriot Act gives the government significant new powers to gather information.”) with In re 
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (“We, therefore, believe firmly, applying 
the balancing test drawn from Keith, that FISA as amended is constitutional because the 
surveillances it authorizes are reasonable.”). 
 121. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 122. Id. (citing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 916 (4th Cir. 1980)). 
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significant foreign intelligence purpose, but it would be only one 
factor in a much broader reasonableness inquiry. Moreover, whereas 
Bin Laden counted the special factors attendant to cooperating with 
foreign governments as a significant cost to requiring a warrant, these 
factors could instead be considered in judging whether the execution 
of a particular search was reasonable. 
Indeed, at least one commentator has recommended replacing 
per se rules of domestic Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with a 
transnational approach to reasonableness.123 Under this approach, 
either “international human rights norms and the search-and-seizure 
practices of the world’s major legal systems,” or the practices and 
expectations of the host country could be considered.124 In his 
Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence, Justice Kennedy hinted at the latter 
when he said that “the differing and perhaps unascertainable 
conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad” were 
reasons not to require a warrant.125 This line of thought echoes an 
opinion Justice Kennedy wrote as a circuit judge that made 
reasonableness the primary inquiry in determining the legality of 
warrantless foreign searches and in which he refused to exclude 
criminal evidence of drug smuggling obtained from warrantless 
wiretaps.126 
Finally, the values implicated by other protections in the Bill of 
Rights could be incorporated into the Fourth Amendment analysis.127 
“A government policy that comes close to the limit set by one of 
these independent clauses [in the Bill of Rights] can, if conjoined with 
a search or seizure, cross over into constitutional 
unreasonableness.”128 For example, searching an American news 
publication’s overseas office could trigger heightened Fourth 
Amendment safeguards and higher standards of justification prior to 
searching because of the obvious First Amendment values at stake.129 
FISA partially recognized this idea by making it clear that an 
American citizen cannot be considered an agent of a foreign power 
 
 123. Eric Bentley, Jr., Toward an International Fourth Amendment: Rethinking Searches and 
Seizures Abroad After Verdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 329, 371 (1994). 
 124. Id. 
 125. 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 126. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 491–93 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 127. Amar, supra note 6, at 805. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. (discussing the “special dangers posed by the government’s searching and 
seizing documents from the press”). 
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“solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First 
Amendment.”130 In addition to the First Amendment, searches of 
attorneys’ offices might trigger heightened Fourth Amendment 
requirements due to Sixth Amendment attorney-client privilege 
concerns, and searches disproportionately focused on certain racial 
groups could implicate the Equal Protection Clause and require more 
stringent standards for searches.131 If judges become willing to place 
greater emphasis on reasonableness, the list of factual scenarios that 
implicate other values in the Bill of Rights would undoubtedly 
expand and lead to protections from governmental interference 
without the unique defects that warrants have in the international 
context. 
To illustrate how this idea might operate, consider the facts of 
Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld.132 The United States Army 
subjected Americans living in Berlin during the Cold War (including 
attorneys, ministers, and journalists) to extensive electronic 
surveillance because their activities, which included supporting 
Senator McGovern for president in 1972 and the impeachment of 
President Nixon, were considered potentially disruptive to Coalition 
morale.133 The court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had 
alleged cognizable First and Sixth Amendment violations, but 
premised these violations on the fact that surveillance was conducted 
without a warrant.134 Instead of dealing with the tenuous warrant 
inquiry, the court could have easily dismissed the defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment on Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
grounds. Because First and Sixth Amendment rights were strongly 
implicated, as well as the fact that the plaintiffs were not suspected of 
being agents of a foreign power or even of serious criminal activities, 
any use of wiretaps would have been considered a clear abuse of 
government power under a reasonableness standard. In addition to 
recognizing private causes of action under the First and Sixth 
Amendments, the court could also have awarded damages for 
 
 130. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
 131. Amar, supra note 6, at 806. 
 132. 410 F. Supp. 144, 158 (D.D.C. 1976). 
 133. Id. at 147. 
 134. Id. at 161 (“Taken together with the allegations of illegal electronic surveillance, the 
complaint sets forth a concerted military effort to discredit certain groups of individuals for 
allegedly innocent activities.”). 
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unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, which leads to the 
final point. 
B. The Damages Remedy 
Americans can currently sue federal officials for Fourth 
Amendment violations, yet they cannot sue the federal government 
itself. The reasonableness doctrine is decidedly underdeveloped, and 
warrants often immunize federal officials from liability.135 Expanding 
the reasonableness doctrine to recognize more instances where a suit 
for damages is appropriate and removing the immunizing potential of 
warrants would offer Americans abroad greater protection from their 
government, as would permitting suits directly against the federal 
government, though that debate is not taken up here. Still, an 
expanded reasonableness regime raises new questions. For instance, 
in cases like Berlin Democratic Club, where the individuals were not 
suspected of any crime, suits for damages clearly offer greater privacy 
protection because there is no expectation of a criminal trial where 
the exclusionary rule may be applied. But in a case where the 
surveilled individual is clearly guilty of a crime, will courts ever be 
able to find the search that produced the incriminating evidence 
unreasonable and then award damages? The answer is “yes” for two 
reasons. First, judges make even more awkward judgments all the 
time by excluding incriminating evidence rather than compensating 
for it. Second, as judges confront new cases through this lens, certain 
actions will be recognized as unreasonable as a matter of law. Law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies operating abroad will be 
deterred from searching one’s home or applying electronic 
surveillance, unless there is a very high likelihood of criminal activity 
or of obtaining very valuable information due to the seriousness of 
the issue being investigated, lest they be slapped with a hefty damages 
judgment. 
Damage judgments also raise indemnity questions, such as 
whether it is fair for taxpayers to pay for abuses of power by law 
 
 135. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
397 (1971) the Supreme Court recognized a private right of action under the Fourth 
Amendment against federal officials who violate the Amendment. While the federal 
government itself has sovereign immunity, many commentators have urged its abolition. Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1211 (2001); Kenneth Culp 
Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 
438–39 (1962). The approach to the Fourth Amendment offered here provides yet another 
justification for allowing suits directly against the government. 
06__THEN.DOC 10/4/2006  1:10 PM 
1086 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1059 
enforcement. Yet the public already pays dearly for such abuses in 
the currency of lost convictions rather than in dollars and cents. 
From an operational perspective, in most cases the plaintiff 
should have the option to be tried by a jury, which “is perfectly placed 
to decide, in any given situation, whom it fears more, the cops or the 
robbers.”136 In the context of national security cases, however, this 
raises an additional complication. Should jury trials for damages be 
allowed when sensitive foreign intelligence information could be 
revealed? If the government is willing to release information in a 
criminal trial before a jury, then the same information, with the same 
cautionary procedures, should be used in a corresponding civil trial. 
As for those cases where the government would not be willing to 
release sensitive information in a criminal trial, or simply doesn’t 
have enough evidence to prosecute one, but is caught in what the 
plaintiff alleges is an unreasonable search, a court could weigh the 
competing interests in camera. Only if the information is absolutely 
vital to the national interest could the court decide not to grant a jury 
trial and evaluate the search’s reasonableness itself. 
One might also ask what good a finding that a search was 
unreasonable would do for a criminal defendant who is convicted on 
evidence so obtained. Yet that is the very point of abandoning the 
exclusionary rule in an overseas context,137 because the rapist, the 
murderer, or the international terrorist should not be turned loose. 
“Thus, the courts best affirm their integrity and fairness not by closing 
their eyes to truthful evidence, but by opening their doors to any civil 
suit brought against wayward government officials, even one brought 
by a convict.”138 The victim of an unreasonable search, even if a 
criminal, should receive damages that compensate in accordance with 
the actual injury suffered, rather than receive the windfall of excluded 
evidence. And to effectively deter the government, punitive damages 
might sometimes be an appropriate reward, especially when one 
acknowledges that some unreasonable searches will never come to 
 
 136. Amar, supra note 6, at 818. 
 137. This is not to say that no evidence should ever be excluded; abandoning the 
exclusionary rule simply means that exclusion is not a requirement, but may be used as just 
another tool in a reasonableness inquiry. In the case of a very intrusive search that reveals only 
minor criminal violations, a judge might consider the search so unreasonable that in addition to 
monetary damages, the evidence should be excluded. Maintaining “the suppression remedy as a 
shotgun in the closet” for the most unreasonable searches might well prevent reckless violations 
of Fourth Amendment standards. Dripps, supra note 7, at 1623. 
 138. Amar, supra note 6, at 793 (emphasis added). 
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light. Unlike exclusion, however, punitive damages are a flexible 
remedy. When the victim has done no wrong, society may choose to 
award the punitives directly to the victim, but when the victim is a 
criminal, the punitives could be diverted into some sort of socially 
beneficial fund.139 
One final objection might be that if they have the right to a jury 
trial, many defendants will file separate civil suits alleging 
unreasonableness after their criminal trial, even when they lose. Yet 
judges could still screen these claims at the summary judgment stage 
to see if they could succeed as a matter of law.140 Or the criminal jury 
might be asked, in addition to their finding of guilt or innocence, to 
determine whether a search or seizure was unreasonable, a threshold 
that the defendant would have to overcome in order to later file a 
civil claim. 
CONCLUSION 
In an era of globalization and the war on terror, Bin Laden is 
merely a precursor to future cases that will force courts to consider 
the propriety of government searches of Americans abroad. Rather 
than flail through the incoherent domestic doctrine, future courts 
would be wise not to recognize a warrant requirement in the overseas 
context. Such a move would be supported by the Fourth 
Amendment’s history and text as well as by the government’s current 
practices, and would obviate a need for any foreign intelligence 
exception. Articulating a more stringent reasonableness standard is 
possible without a great deal of judicial innovation due to the lack of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the overseas context, and would 
avoid the logistical problems and dangers to security associated with 
requiring warrants abroad. Finally, readily awarding damages to 
victims of unreasonable searches would better deter government 
officials than the current exclusionary rule and, thus, make the 
 
 139. Professor Amar suggests a fund to educate Americans about the Fourth Amendment 
and comfort victims of crime and police brutality. Id. at 815. If the exclusionary rule were only 
abandoned in the overseas context, perhaps these damages could be used to compensate victims 
of international crime and terrorism and to promote tolerance between people of all nations. 
 140. Again, this Note only addresses searches and seizures of Americans abroad. If 
reasonableness principles did come to dominate domestic Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
the number of civil suits filed would likely be great. Perhaps the volume of cases might best be 
handled by establishing panels to prescreen cases for a likelihood of success on the merits 
before passing them to a judge, or by assigning prescreening to magistrates who, incidentally, 
would be spending less time reviewing requests for warrants. 
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American people for whose protection the Fourth Amendment was 
written more “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”141 
 
 141. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
